The Influences of the Canadian Armed Forces on the Revision of US Army Field Manual 3-24

A Monograph

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14. ABSTRACT

In 2006, the United States Army published FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* because of the growing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The impacts of this new doctrinal were profound not only in the United States military, but also with its policy and strategy makers, the media, and throughout American society. FM 3-24's ideas also resonated within Western military communities. The doctrine defined the paradigm by which Western society would conduct counterinsurgency at the beginning of the 21st century. Yet, eight years after its publication, the US Army updated and released a new version of its counterinsurgency doctrine. This monograph will argue that Canadian doctrine and its operations in Afghanistan in 2009-2010, was a critical influence on the 2014 revision of FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*.

This project's foundations are in the social sciences and uses a process-tracing approach to analyze a single case study. Blending ideas of social constructivism, scientific investigation in the form of paradigms, and an analytical, historically based model of doctrine, the monograph explains how Canada influenced a key aspect of American counterinsurgency doctrine. For it was Canadian doctrine and military operations in southern Afghanistan that saw the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach transform into the current SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION framework. Counterinsurgency campaigns and the associated debates about capabilities and capacities, from 2005 to 2014, used the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach as a nucleus to the narrative. Considering future counterinsurgency operations will likely us the SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION framework as the nexus for future dialogue and debate, and it is clear that Canada has had a significant impact upon its greatest ally.

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Abstract

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TRANSITION framework as the nexus for future dialogue and debate, and it is clear that Canada
has had a significant impact upon its greatest ally.

Contents

Acknowledgement

Acronyms

ABCA	The Armies of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia/New Zealand
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
COIN	Counterinsurgency / Counter Insurgency
FM	Field Manual
HAM	Hearts and Minds
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force
JTF-K	Joint Task Force-Kandahar
MCWP	Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OPP	Operational Planning Process
PM	Prime Minister
RAND	Research and Development Corporation
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

Tables

Chapter 1 – Introduction

> On so vast a field of action, traditional armed forces no longer enjoy their accustomed decisive role. Victory no longer depends on one battle over a given terrain. Military operations, as combat actions carried out against opposing armed forces, are of only limited importance and are never the total conflict.
>
> — Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*

The Canadian and United States militaries share many commonalities. Historical enmities from the early 19th century and the War of 1812 had dissipated such that, by the conclusion of World War II in 1945, the two countries became strong battlefield and strategic allies. Throughout the Cold War, Canada and the United States further strengthened this bond. By the beginning of the 21st century, the two states found themselves again in a military partnership as they conducted counterinsurgency operations in Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Canada, a country with no significant recent experience with this type of warfare, learned a substantial amount of tactics, techniques, and procedures from their American ally. Yet, considering the vast strategic, operational, and tactical experience the United States military had with respect to countering insurgencies, is it also possible that Canada had a profound impact on the world's foremost military superpower? Did the Canadian Army have anything to teach its American counterparts, and could it have influenced the US Army's approach to counterinsurgency?

The purpose of this monograph is to demonstrate how Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine and the execution of counterinsurgency operations in Kandahar province, Afghanistan, influenced the US Army. The fact that US Army counterinsurgency doctrine underwent a significant alteration from initial publication in 2006 to its revision in 2014 indicates that the US Army's 2006 counterinsurgency doctrine had to evolve to keep pace with the changed battlefield circumstances. That Canada, as a middle-power nation with a relatively small army, had an acute impact on the development of US Army doctrine is an area not recognized sufficiently. Simply put, Canadian counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan from 2009-2010, coupled with Canadian Army counterinsurgency doctrine published in 2008, was critical to the reformulation of US Army

counterinsurgency doctrine, represented in the 2014 revision of FM 3-24 *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*. By highlighting Canadian impacts on current US Army counterinsurgency doctrine, there is hope that future US Army doctrine writers will not overlook the potential contributions that Canadian allies can provide to its future doctrine development.

This monograph will investigate and analyze a range of scholarly writings as well as select primary source material in order to show that Canadian counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan from 2009-2010, coupled with Canadian Army counterinsurgency doctrine of 2008, was critical to the formulation of certain aspects of current US Army counterinsurgency doctrine. This project highlights the significant differences between Canadian and United States counterinsurgency doctrines. Further, the monograph draws attention to critical differences between the US counterinsurgency doctrine of 2006 and the current 2014 revision. Finally, the paper argues that current US Army counterinsurgency doctrine reflects certain aspects of the methodology Canada used while conducting counterinsurgency operations in southern Afghanistan.

The theoretical framework for this monograph is a blend of social constructivism, scientific investigation in the form of paradigms, and an analytical, historically based model of doctrine. Combining these ideas results in a richer understanding of doctrine and frames the investigation of the three doctrinal manuals in question.

As a means to frame this monograph and in an effort to focus analysis, this project limits its analysis to United States and Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine from 2006 to the present. Also constraining the scope of study is that, with respect to counterinsurgency operations, cited events are from 2009 to 2010 and only from Afghanistan. Further, research is limited to the strategic and operational levels; there is no discussion or investigation of counterinsurgency tactics or the tactical level of war. Finally, there is a distinct lack of accessible military primary source material, especially Canadian campaign plans and orders, due to many of those items remaining classified.

Within this monograph, all references to the term doctrine refer to a military sense of the word, meaning "fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."[1] There is a lack of scholarly consensus, especially between United States and Canadian authors, regarding the grammatical use of the term counterinsurgency vice counter insurgency; however, this paper will utilize counterinsurgency throughout unless a citation or publication title uses the term COIN or counter insurgency. As the literature review will demonstrate, the terms insurgency and counterinsurgency are difficult concepts to describe and as such, they will not be defined at this point, trusting that the reader will appreciate the analysis conducted within that chapter. Finally, it is recognized that both the 2006 and 2014 versions of the United States' counterinsurgency doctrine is applicable to both the US Army as FM 3-24, and to the US Marine Corps as MCWP 3-33.5; however, the monograph will refer to this publication only as FM 3-24.

The organization of this monograph is an introduction, the methodology, a literature review, a single case study, the findings, and the conclusion. Research begins with a review of germane materials that frame an understanding of what constitutes doctrine. An investigation of what comprises an insurgency and a counterinsurgency then follows. The exploration section transitions to investigating the United States context that resulted in the production of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* in 2006. The case study of Canadian influences on US Army counterinsurgency doctrine then follows, which begins by examining the Canadian context leading to the production of B-GL-323-004/FP-003 (B-GL-323), *Counter Insurgency Operations* in 2008. The analysis then compares and contrasts the two doctrines in order to highlight key differences and then investigates Canada's counterinsurgency activities in Afghanistan from 2002-2010. The case study concludes with the key differences between the 2006 version of FM 3-24 and the 2014 revision, FM 3-24,

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[1] Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) 01, *Canadian Military Doctrine* (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2009), 1-1.

Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. The findings consider causal relationships between the Canadian Army counterinsurgency doctrine and operations in Afghanistan to determine impacts upon the 2014 revision of FM 3-24. The conclusion summarizes the monograph in general and specifies the influences of Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine and military operations in southern Afghanistan had on the current iteration of FM 3-24.

Chapter 2 – Methodology

The aim of this project is to conduct an in-depth and analytical investigation of available written materials that support answering the research question proposed in the introduction. The intent is to conduct a process-tracing analysis that will identify causal relationships within a single case rather than looking to conduct a cross-case analysis.[2] This allows for a much deeper understanding than could be reached by studying multiple cases more superficially.

Analysis of this case as outlined is not without some significant challenges. First, as a single case study, this work represents a limited perspective that overlooks other causal relationships in the 2014 revision of FM 3-24. Second, this novel research and a study such as this has not been attempted before. However, neither of these two challenges should dissuade attempts in this field, there is significant value in this project. At best, this monograph confirms causality and United States and Canadian doctrine writers have another source through which they can draw upon for future doctrine development. At worst, clear causality is not established; however, the analysis provided within this project does contribute to the overall body of knowledge about United States and Canadian counterinsurgency doctrines, an understanding of similarities and differences in the military cultures of the two countries, and can spur additional research in the field of United States-Canadian military relationships and future doctrine development.

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[2] Oisin Tansey, "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 40, no. 4 (October 2007): 765, accessed January 8, 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20452062?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

Chapter 3 – Literature Review

The intent of the literature review is to provide the background necessary to allow for case study analysis. The chapter details the information used to generate knowledge of doctrine, explores definitions of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and provides a general overview of the situation in the United States that leads to publication of new counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006.

Section 1 – What Is Doctrine

The notion that there is a universal understanding of what constitutes doctrine is circumspect. The proliferation and continuous introduction of new terminology, methods of problem solving and planning, coupled with the overabundance of buzzwords and jargon only serves to muddle the mind of military practitioners, strategists, and statesmen.[3] Yet, despite doctrine's perceived pitfalls and shortcomings, it continues to serve as a useful guide for military practitioners, as well government policy makers, by capturing relevant lessons that modify future military operations. By investigating and synthesizing the works of Thomas Kuhn, Aaron Jackson, as well as, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, a framework for a better understanding of the role and use of doctrine emerges.

Doctrine as Paradigms

Normal science, according to Kuhn, implies a method of research based upon acknowledged achievements within a given scientific community; further practice of science builds upon these bases. These foundations are what Kuhn refers to as paradigms, the "models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research."[4] Certain methods secure their status as paradigms because they are generally better at dealing with problems that the practitioners

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[3] Aaron P. Jackson, *The Roots of Military Doctrine: Changes and Continuity in Understanding the Practice of Warfare* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 1.

[4] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 10.

recognize as being acute; they increase the degree of certainty between predictions and fact.[5] Seen in this light, and as described by Jackson, doctrine exists in the realm of normal science as described as a paradigm. Doctrine is the result of the process of knowledge acquirement and promotion.[6] However, doctrine changes over time and at certain points, how a military approaches and interacts with new challenges results in a fundamental change of its doctrine.

All doctrines, like all paradigms, are subject to change. The interaction of doctrine with the various environments and circumstances military practitioners operate in eventually challenges the foundation responsible for that doctrine. As Kuhn illustrates, rules shaped for one context interact with situations that, although similar, necessitate a modification to the original paradigm. Modifications to the original paradigm can happen for only so long. Eventually the extent and divergence of the changes call into question the validity of the paradigm, establishing a crisis point.[7] Benjamin Jensen posits when there is a shock to a system sufficient to warrant a fundamental change, doctrine faces a crisis point. Battlefield defeat, significant enhancements or reductions in capabilities and capacities, changes in the international system, and the introduction of new technologies are but some of the circumstances that can result in placing a current doctrinal paradigm into crisis.[8]

Kuhn indicates that the scientific community reacts to a paradigm crisis in one of three ways. First, the normal science proves able to deal with the challenge and the paradigm remains valid. Second, the crisis is of such a magnitude that it exceeds the tools and capabilities available to the normal scientists; therefore, the scientists identify the problem but set it aside for future

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[5] Kuhn, 23-24.

[6] Jackson, 7.

[7] Kuhn, 66-76.

[8] Benjamin Jensen, "Escaping the Iron Cage: The Institutional Foundations of FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 2 (December 2015): 215-216, accessed January 24, 2017, http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fjss20/39/2?nav=tocList.

consideration using newly created future tools. In this case, the existing paradigm remains valid and in use. Third, the crisis necessitates a new methodology or approach, and a battle over utilizing the existing paradigm or shifting to a new one begins.[9] It is this last situation, the paradigm shift, which is most applicable to this monograph. Before investigating how FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (2006) represented a US Army doctrinal paradigm shift, it is necessary to explore how doctrine matured throughout its collective history.

Four Schools, Positivism and Anti-Positivism

The history of Western doctrine proves the existence of Kuhn's paradigms in this field. For Jackson, the "nature, scope, and content of doctrine can only be fully understood in light of the intellectual context in which it is written."[10] Using Kuhn as a lens through which the history of Western doctrine development manifested, Jackson posits that four distinct ontological schools represent the spectrum of contemporary doctrine. Each of the four schools, which developed in a historically sequential manner, does not represent a paradigm shift per say, but rather the creation of new paradigms that worked in conjunction with those that proceeded it.

The first collective is the technical manual school, which draws its linage to 1607 and the production of the first modern drill book. Technical manual school doctrine focuses on the correct utilization of military hardware, its application is narrow, and it provides correct and incorrect practices and techniques in absolute and uncompromising terms.[11] A contemporary example of a technical manual school's doctrine would be FM 3-22.68 *Crew-Served Machine Guns: 5.56-mm and 7.62-mm*. Yet, a new doctrinal paradigm came to the fore when it was no longer sufficient to describe only how to use an instrument of military hardware, but how to employ it within the overall context of the battlefield environment.

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[9] Kuhn, 84.

[10] Jackson, 87.

[11] Ibid., 12-15.

The second grouping is the tactical manual school, it came to prominence in the latter portion of the 18th century through the 19th century, and theorists including Paul Gideon de Maizeroy, Henry Lloyd, Heinrich Dietrich von Bürlow, and Henri Jomini influenced its development. As the name implies, the tactical manual school intends to provide the most current methods and principles that guides the employment of military forces on the battlefield.[12] Existing examples of US Army doctrine of the tactical manual school includes FM 3-21.10 *The Infantry Rifle Company*, FM 3-20.96 *Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron*, and FM 3-90.6 *Brigade Combat Team*. The tactical manual school dominates doctrine, even in the present. Yet, it was America's experiences post-Vietnam that was the catalyst for the creation of the next doctrinal paradigm.

The third category is the operational manual school, which arrived as the US Army grappled with its post-Vietnam doctrine. Dealing with the Soviet threat to Western Europe, the increased potency of modern weaponry demonstrated in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and a reorientation towards conventional land warfare all combined to create a requirement for a new doctrinal approach. Recognition of the new paradigm came in 1982 when the US Army released FM 100-5 *Operations*, which introduced the concept of Air Land Battle. However, the most critical aspect of FM 100-5 was the introduction of the operational level of war to Western doctrine. As Jackson illustrates, FM 100-5 "established the [US] Army's perception of the scope of its role in relation to policy, suggesting that once policymakers had set policy goals and determined strategic objectives, the Army should be entrusted to plan and conduct operations to fulfill these objectives."[13] Contemporary examples of doctrine in the operational manual school include US Army ADP and ADRP 3-90 *Offense and Defense*, ADP and ADRP 3-07 *Stability*, and ADP and ADRP 3-28 *Defense Support to Civil Authorities*. By the mid-1990's, and as highlighted by the

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[12] Jackson, 15-17.

[13] Ibid., 21.

1991 Persian Gulf War, the methodology for how war is to be prosecuted necessitated the creation of the final doctrinal paradigm.

The fourth collective is the military strategic school, which Jackson describes as "philosophical in nature, establishing fundamental principles or a core conceptual framework that is intended to describe, categorize, and justify military activities as much as guide the application of military force in pursuit of national strategic goals."[14] 'Keystone' or 'capstone' doctrines that normally rest at the top of doctrinal hierarchies typify these types of manuals. Another distinctive feature of military strategic school doctrine is the intended audience. Doctrine from this school focuses on policy makers, the civilian population, and foreign allies as much as it provides a declaration of institutional strategy to its own military members.[15] Modern illustrations of doctrine in the fourth school include ADP 1-0 *The Army*, ADRP 1-0 *The Army Profession*, and ADP and ADRP 3-0 *Unified Land Operations*. The challenge with respect to understanding doctrine comes when production of new manuals incorporate aspects of the various schools in a single publication; in order to appreciate this phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the notions of positivism, anti-positivism, and how these concepts conflict.

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[14] Jackson, 29.

[15] Ibid., 29-31.

Table 1. The Four Doctrinal Schools

	Introductory Timeframe	Description	Ontology	Modern US Army Example
First School: **The Technical Manual**	15th – 17th Centuries	Provides correct techniques and training for employment of military hardware.	No relationship to a military's ontology. Discusses matters in isolation of external factors.	FM 3-22.34 *TOW Weapon System*
Second School: **The Tactical Manual**	18th – 19th Centuries	Describes up-to-date tactics at the time of publication. Delineates acceptable from unacceptable tactical practices.	An implicit relationship that assumes away the 'bigger picture' in order to focus on isolated events in time and space (like a battlefield).	FM 3-90-1 *Offense and Defense*
Third School: **The Operational Manual**	Mid – Late 20th Century	Tactics as a subset of operations. Describes a military's role as subordinate to national policy. Provides 'guidance' for operational commanders and staffs.	An explicit relationship that defines preferred methods of conduct within a limited scope. Gives details as constants only as necessary to explain why certain operating methods are required.	ADRP 2-0 *Intelligence*
Fourth School: **The Military Strategic Manual**	Late 20th Century	Philosophical in nature, establish fundamental principles, and core conceptual frameworks. Guides the application of military force to achieve national strategic goals. Has a target audience extending beyond the military.	Examine the broad range of relationships, seeks to define the operational and strategic environments, and offers approaches to overcome general challenges posed within a given environment.	ADP 6-22 *Army Leadership*

Source: Created by author, February 14, 2017

From the 17th century to the present, ontological realism is the principal approach of Western doctrine, with positivism as the epistemological method of doctrine's formation.[16] The term positivism began in the latter half of the 19th century, as part of the Enlightenment and its impact on the second school of doctrine was immediate. Positivist doctrine, according to Christopher Paparone, "focuses on reductionism, empiricism, linearity, mathematical logic, and predictable cause-and-effect relationships."[17] The bulk of contemporary doctrine still subscribes to positivism; methodologies through which militaries make decisions, such as the US Army's Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and the Canadian Armed Forces's (CAF) Operational

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[16] Ontological realism "emphasizes that the world beyond human cognition is structured and tangible regardless of whether or not humans perceive and label it. This perspective is often contrasted with nominalism, which emphasizes that the identification and labeling of structures is fundamentally necessary for establishing their existence." Jackson, 59.

[17] Christopher R. Paparone, "FM 3-0: Operations on the Cusp of Postpositivism," *Small Wars Journal* (May 2008), accessed December 22, 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/65-paparone.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/65-paparone.pdf.

Planning Process (OPP) are the best indications of this claim. These methods are "process oriented and requires well-controlled hard-science-like research methods to generate creative hypothesis, identify critical factors (variables), and courses of action as well as plans for contingencies if things do not go as planned."[18] Positivist doctrine emphasizes productivity and is quantified objectively using mathematical probabilities and measures of effectiveness. Further, positive doctrine is rule-based, sequential, and values highly regimented command and control.[19] US Army doctrine of Jackson's tactical manual school remains highly positivist.[20] Yet, in the military's contemporary environments, the value of doctrine with only a positivist approach is questionable.

The two contemporary variables that call the efficacy of strictly positivist doctrine into question are complexity theory and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The introduction of anti-positivist doctrine, according to Jackson, is a result of these two variables. Anti-positivism draws its lineage from the late 19th century intellectuals, such as Max Weber and Wilhelm Dilthey, and the assertions "that the social sciences and humanities differ from the natural sciences and therefore require a different methodology."[21] Doctrines subscribing to an anti-positivist approach recognize that complexity, human emotions, and subjective beliefs influence human interactions and must be accounted for. Unlike doctrine of Jackson's first and second schools, anti-positivist doctrine requires its practitioners to exercise improvisation and mental agility. It implies that the military

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[18] Jackson, 67-68; Paparone, "FM 3-0".

[19] Paparone, "FM 3-0".

[20] "Soldiers prefer structural complexity and linear phenomena. Such problems are easy to control through technical reduction and a systematic method-based solution. They are also easier to recognize and place in categories. Modern U.S. Army tactical doctrine fits this mold, specifying the tasks, conditions, and standards for every task from tank gunnery to conducting a defense." United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5-500, *The U.S. Army Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design* Version 1.0 (Fort Monroe, VA: Army Capabilities Integration Center, 2008), 8.

[21] Jackson, 74-75.

must respect alternate understandings of situations, embrace experiential learning, and emphasize local initiative in the face of unpredictable tactical situations.[22]

As Jackson argues, it is the initial military failures in dealing with insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan that demonstrates the flaw in an overreliance on positivist doctrines.[23] Notwithstanding if doctrine is either positivist, anti-positivist, or a combination of both approaches, published doctrine informs and guides action for those actors who subscribe to its lessons. In essence, doctrinal manuals are textbooks.

Text Book Science

Describing doctrine in terms of paradigms within schools of thought is a good approach theoretically. However, when finally written, published and distributed, doctrine is a textbook. As Kuhn articulates, textbooks "aim to communicate the vocabulary and syntax of a contemporary scientific language."[24] Doctrinal manuals are the method through which militaries provide the language and ideas that represent their current operating paradigm, specify the roadmaps for the expected actions of their followers, and advertise to people outside of the military institution what to expect when the military is conducting its business.

Doctrinal manuals (like textbooks) "refer only to that part of the work of past scientists [military practitioners] that can easily be viewed as contributions to the statement and solution of the texts' paradigm problems."[25] Doctrinal manuals do not tend to focus on the past unless history, in some way, supports what the current paradigm is attempting to communicate. Instead, as Stephen

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[22] Paparone, "FM 3-0".

[23] Jackson, 71.

[24] Kuhn, 136.

[25] Ibid., 138.

Lauer argues, doctrine is forward looking. Doctrine is the military's current perception of its own history as it relates to the anticipation of future action.[26]

In essence, a doctrinal manual is the written interpretation of the paradigm subscribed to by the military at the time of its writing. "No wonder that textbooks [and doctrinal manuals] and the historical tradition they imply have to be rewritten after each scientific revolution."[27] When the paradigm of the aforementioned school of doctrine has undergone a shift, there is publishing of new doctrinal manuals. Doctrine is thus a description of the paradigm a military believes it will face and is a guide to solution formulization that will enable success. However, doctrine is more than a military's written code or its ideas; doctrine is also a societal contract, a fully articulated understanding of the role a military has, as a social institution, to the society that creates it.

Secondary Socialization

Jackson, crediting Howard Coombs, posits that doctrine is the articulation of a military's belief system; it is "the accepted paradigms by which a military understands, prepares for, and (at least in theory) conducts warfare."[28] As Berger and Luckman describe, this belief system is then, and ultimately, the means through which a military undertakes its role in the secondary socialization of the citizens of its given society.[29] Doctrine communicates the role-specific knowledge and vocabularies of its military practitioners and is the guide through which a military conducts secondary socialization. Doctrine represents the discourse between the primary social

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[26] G. Stephen Lauer, "The Tao of Doctrine: Contesting an Art of Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* 82 (3rd Quarter 2016): 119.

[27] Kuhn, 138.

[28] Jackson, 6.

[29] "Secondary socialization is the internalization of institutional or institution-based 'subworlds.' … we may say that secondary socialization is the acquisition of role-specific knowledge, the roles being directly or indirectly rooted in the division of labor. Secondary socialization requires the acquisition of role-specific vocabularies…Furthermore, they, too, require at least the rudiments of a legitimating apparatus, often accompanied by ritual or material symbols." Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1967), 138-139.

institution (in this case, the state) and one of its secondary social institutions (the military).[30]

Quintessentially, and building off Berger and Luckmann, doctrine is a contract between a state and

its military.[31] As secondary socialization cannot be effective without being subject to the hierarchy

of primary socialization, doctrine stipulates not just how a military will conduct itself, what it

values, and for whom it applies. It also binds the military to a code of conduct that is both reflective

of, and acceptable to, the entire social strata of the state and its people. All of this theorizing about

what constitutes doctrine leads to a conclusion; doctrine is a manifestation of what a military, as a

social institution, believes. Those beliefs, in turn, determine how a military operates.

However, a military's beliefs, as expressed by its doctrine, are not the only views available

within a given society. In fact, most non-military members of a society do not subscribe to doctrinal

definitions of theories, actions, or purposes. An investigation of what past and contemporary

theorists and authors write about insurgencies and counterinsurgencies highlights the fact that there

is often no consensus concerning the terms, approaches, and lessons prescribed in a given doctrinal

manual.

Section 2 – What Is an Insurgency?

A fundamental problem with a modern study of counterinsurgency starts with the challenge

of defining what an insurgency is. As Carl von Clausewitz explained, one should not enter into a

conflict until one understands what that conflict is.[32] As such, recognizing what constitutes an

insurgency, and what separates it from other types of conflict, is critical to ensuring a sound

strategy and the application of appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures. Many contemporary

authors on counterinsurgency, such as Max Boot and Thomas Mockaitis, have described this same

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[30] Lauer, 119.

[31] Berger and Luckmann, 138-139.

[32] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 579.

challenge.[33] The crux of the issue is the various descriptions that many writers and theorists attribute to forms of warfare that fall short of large scale, state versus state, conventional war.

Herein lays one of the key challenges with respect to research in this field; there is no clear and agreed upon definition of what constitutes an insurgency. Yet, while there is no universally accepted meaning of insurgency, there are many common characteristics. Summarized by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Paul Rich, these theorists offer that insurgencies are politically motivated and seek a political end state in which the insurgents seek to usurp the political power of an established and legitimate government and replace it with their own. Insurgencies use violence (such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare) as the principle ways to achieve their political aspirations. However, as insurgencies are political in nature, insurgents use other ways (such as propaganda and subversion through an alternative governing body) in conjunction with violence to achieve their ends. In addition, insurgencies seek to control territory and the populations found within and focus on becoming the dominant power within a given state. Finally, an insurgency is a social phenomenon and as such, they not only differ with respect to their physical environments, but they also differ greatly between various societies.[34] The challenge in understanding what defines an insurgency is substantial; identifying what constitutes counterinsurgency is just as taxing.

Section 3 – What Is Counterinsurgency?

Similar to the challenge of defining what an insurgency is, there is likewise no consensus that describes counterinsurgency. As a common starting point and as outlined by Steven Metz, most Western states follow a Clausewitzian theory of war and view insurgency as essentially a political activity. As such, Western states tend to express their understanding of the efforts to counter

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[33] Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* (New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), xxi-xxii; Thomas Mockaitis, *Resolving Insurgencies* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 6.

[34] Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Paul B. Rich, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Some Conclusions," in *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, eds. Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 360-361.

insurgencies as political activities. This is why almost all Western strategies and doctrines emphasize the need for political reform within the societies impacted by insurgencies.[35]

One effect stemming from the diversity of insurgencies is the overabundance of literature about countering insurgencies. David Ucko indicates that this diversity only serves to complicate the contemporary understanding of what constitutes counterinsurgency. He questions if counterinsurgency stands as a thesis, a theory or a practice, is it operational or strategic, or is it an antithesis?[36] The benefit of Ucko's approach is that through an analysis of what counterinsurgency is not, he arrives at a useful definition of what it is. Ucko believes that counterinsurgency is an antithesis to conventional warfare. "What the counterinsurgency principles have done is to illustrate the unique logic of political warfare and its distinctiveness from the 'conventional' types of military campaigns for which most Western armed forces are structured and trained."[37] It is against the backdrop of the use of conventional methods and thoughts about warfare that the idea of counterinsurgency comes into its own.

Counterinsurgency is not decisive battle, it is not about a quick and easy war with a clear delineation of victory, it is not about firepower and maneuver, and it is not about the sole use of the military aspect of national power to achieve desired ends. Instead, counterinsurgency implies a focus on the political dimension of conflict over the military. Counterinsurgency emphasizes the importance of relationships with the population and that warfare of this type will likely be a protracted and resource intensive campaign. Ultimately, it necessitates a requirement for Western politicians, diplomats, economists, militaries, and societies to view war and warfare through a 'non-conventional' lens.

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[35] Steven Metz, "Rethinking Insurgency," in *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,* eds. Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 51-52.

[36] David Ucko, "Whither Counterinsurgency," in *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, eds. Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 68-74.

[37] Ibid., 73.

Even though Ucko does not define counterinsurgency by the terms 'enemy-centric' and 'population-centric,' these two concepts feature prominently in United States and Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine. The terms are also referenced extensively throughout most contemporary counterinsurgency theorizing and scholarship. As such, it is important to understand what these notions imply.

Population-Centric and Enemy-Centric Approaches to Counterinsurgency

Most contemporary counterinsurgency theorists recognize two distinctly different philosophies with respect to countering insurgencies. The two camps that dominate counterinsurgency theory are population-centric and enemy-centric advocates. As such, it is important to understand what each method purports in order to appreciate how the different approaches have influenced United States and Canadian doctrine. However, before dealing with the contemporary, it is important to deal with the historical foundations that shaped current Western counterinsurgency approaches.

As described by Conrad Crane and Metz, the influences of three mid-20th century counterinsurgency theorists dominated the counterinsurgency theories found in contemporary US and Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine.[38] Consequentially, one can consider David Galula, Robert Thompson, and Frank Kitson as the grandfathers of contemporary Western counterinsurgency theory. In essence, these authors laid the foundation onto which the early 21st century counterinsurgency theorists built their beliefs.

More recently, there are a select number of theorists that dominate the Western counterinsurgency narrative. Almost all counterinsurgency scholarship undertaken since 2001 highlights the works of John Nagl or David Kilcullen. Therefore, these theorists have arguably

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[38] Conrad Crane, "United States," in *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges*, eds. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 61-62; Metz, 33.

become the fathers of modern Western counterinsurgency theory. The dependent variable between

all counterinsurgency authors involves, in some way, a clear delineation between two

methodologies to counterinsurgency: population-centric and enemy-centric approaches.

Defining what constitutes a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency is as difficult

as defining what is an insurgency. Kilcullen describes population-centric counterinsurgency as a

focus "on the population, seeking to protect it from harm by – or interaction with – the insurgent,

competing with the insurgent for influence and control at the grassroots level."[39] Indeed, Nagl does

not even use the term, instead referring to the concept as the indirect approach. Meaning that,

"while continuing to attack the armed elements of the insurgency… it is essential also to attack the

support of the people for the insurgents… [focus] on dividing the people from the insurgents,

removing the support that they require to challenge the government effectively… ."[40]

Eric Jardine and Simon Palamar build off Kilcullen and suggest that the population-centric

counterinsurgency approach "should concentrate on directly securing the population. Directly

securing the population means deterring insurgents from targeting civilians by providing a visible

and consistent counterinsurgency presence near major population centers, rather than conducting

lengthy search-and-destroy missions."[41] Also citing Kilcullen as a reference, Paul Lushenko and

John Hardy state that, "[p]opulation-centric COIN focuses on protecting the population from

insurgent violence, improving perceptions of the government's legitimacy and authority, and

improving economic development."[42] Another Kilcullen disciple is Spyridon Plakoudas, who

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[39] David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), xv.

[40] John Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 28.

[41] Eric Jardine and Simon Palamar, "From Medusa Past Kantolo: Testing the Effectiveness of Canada's Enemy-Centric and Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Operational Strategies," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 36, no. 7 (July 2013), 592.

[42] Paul Lushenko and John Hardy, "Panjwai: A Tale of Two COINs in Afghanistan," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 27, no. 1 (February 2016), 109.

provides his explanation as an "approach [that] must, first and foremost, seize control of the (local) population in order to isolate and overpower the insurgents."[43]

A final author who provides a somewhat different perspective is James Corum, who says:

> [population-centric counterinsurgency] is about nation building and addressing the needs of the population. Thus, the most important military forces might be the civil affairs teams, the engineers, and the medical units. The combat forces … are likely to have secondary roles as security providers.[44]

While population-centric counterinsurgency approaches are plentiful in Western writing and doctrine, enemy-centric counterinsurgency is a fundamentally different approach that also resonates in contemporary writing and counterinsurgency operations.

Introducing enemy-centric counterinsurgency theory is Plakoudas, who states that:

> … the proponents of an enemy-centric approach consider the insurgent's military defeat as the primary task of the government. According to the central idea of this school of thought, the extermination of the insurgents will definitely terminate the (local) population's rebellion. Viewing 'counterinsurgency as a variant of conventional warfare…the insurgents must be wiped out through vigorous military operations.[45]

Nagl, who is an advocate of the population-centric counterinsurgency approach and does not describe enemy-centric counterinsurgency in detail, implies that enemy-centric counterinsurgency "is much like conventional war in the European setting…In order to defeat the enemy, it is only necessary to defeat his armed forces."[46] Kilcullen, also a population-centric counterinsurgency supporter, equates an enemy-centric counterinsurgency approach as seeking "to destroy this network, proceeding from the assumption that removing the network removes the problem. In this sense, like most conventional warfare, it is 'enemy-centric.'"[47]

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[43] Spyridon Plakoudas, "Strategy in Counterinsurgency: A Distilled Approach," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 2 (February 2015), 133.

[44] James S. Corum, *Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgencies.* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2008), 26-27.

[45] Plakoudas, 132-133.

[46] Nagl, 27.

[47] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, xv.

Understanding population-centric and enemy-centric counterinsurgency is important for the analysis portion of this monograph. The phrases feature prominently in discussions with respect to how Canada conducted counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan from 2005 to 2011. Equally critical is an understanding of the overall context that leads the US Army to develop new counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006.

Section 4 – The United States Context

RAND

The evolution of United States counterinsurgency doctrine has been inconsistent since the end of the Second World War. Yet, one of the most influential and consistent organizations on the theorizing and development of United States counterinsurgency concepts is the Research and Development Corporation (RAND).[48] As summarized by Sebastian Gorka and Kilcullen, as well as Austin Long, RAND entered into the realm of counterinsurgency theorizing in 1958.[49] As the conflict in Vietnam ceased in the early 1970s, the United States government and military's interests in Counterinsurgency waned and RAND focused its efforts on other projects. During the 1980s and throughout President Reagan's two terms, and as the United States became more concerned with rising insurgencies in Central America, RAND again pursued counterinsurgency research and

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[48] "A Brief History of RAND," RAND Corporation, accessed January 19, 2017, http://www.rand.org/about/history/a-brief-history-of-rand.html. In October 1945, project RAND established itself under a special contract to the Douglas Aircraft Company with the aim of connecting military planning with private scientific research and development. In May 1948, RAND separated from the Douglas Aircraft Company to become an independent, non-profit organization. Early RAND contributions were not limited to only military fields and included involvement in early space systems, digital computing, and artificial intelligence.

[49] Sebastian Gorka and David Kilcullen, "An Actor-centric Theory of War: Understanding the Difference Between COIN and Counterinsurgency," *Joint Force Quarterly* 60 (1st Quarter 2011), 15; Austin Long, *On "Other War": Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 5-7. It was the inauguration of John F. Kennedy in 1961, and the introduction of the 'Flexible Response' strategy, that RAND became a major contributor to United States counterinsurgency research and theorizing. RAND's analysts produced myriad products throughout the Vietnam era, much of which significantly influenced the analysis, discussion, debate and conduct of US government and military activities in Vietnam.

analysis. RAND's focus on counterinsurgency continued through President Clinton's two terms and

was broadened to include work on stability and counterterrorism theorizing.[50] Even though

RAND's work on counterinsurgency continues into the current day, its development of two

counterinsurgency theories in the 1960s dominated United States thinking, and subsequent doctrine

development, going into the 21st century: Hearts and Minds (HAM) theory and Cost/benefit theory.

HAM theory focused on increasing the political rights of a state's population and increasing

standards of living in an effort to address the grievances that caused an insurgency. This was the

dominant counterinsurgency paradigm in the 1960s and it continues to the present day.[51] In essence,

this theory is the foundation of the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency. However,

HAM theory was not without criticism, and cost/benefit theorists began to challenge HAM in 1965.

Cost/benefit theory had its roots in social-economics and viewed populations "as rational

actors that would respond in more or less predictable ways to incentives and sanctions from the

competing systems of the insurgent and counterinsurgent."[52] Cost/benefit theory called for a focus

on the urban population centers, as these areas were more likely to be in control of government

agencies. This theory also down played the impacts of a population's preferences and emotions.

Ultimately, the introduction of ratcheted escalation and marginal costs arguments challenged the

cost/benefit theory.[53] Long concludes that what is needed in the development of future

counterinsurgency doctrines and campaigns is to strike a balance and a utilization of the positive

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[50] Long, 9-11.

[51] Ibid., 23.

[52] Ibid., 25.

[53] Ibid., 26-30. Ratcheted Escalation describes the challenge created by the escalation of effects by each side in a conflict that effectively makes de-escalation all but impossible. Using a ratchet as a metaphor, there is free movement in one direction (escalation) without the ability to move in the opposite direction (de-escalation). Marginal costs refer to an imbalance of inputs necessary by two actors in order to secure the same outcomes for a given action.

impacts of both theories.[54] As far as influences on counterinsurgency doctrine development are concerned, RAND contributed positively; the same is not true with respect to the US Army's approach in the post-Vietnam era.

Post-Vietnam

The trope regarding the outcome of the United States' war in Vietnam is that American society and its institutions withdrew from types of warfare that fell short of what it considered conventional conflict. This situation was widely characterized as the 'never-again' school of thought regarding the employment of military forces. As Douglas Porch explains, "the Vietnam experience inoculated the United States military against counterinsurgency operations and reinforced its preference for big battalions as the American way of war."[55] According to Rich, following its withdrawal from Vietnam, the US Army buried counterinsurgency into the far corners of the institution, a specialty skill set for special operations, and not something that the main field forces need concern themselves with.[56] By the mid-1980s, a conventional focus on operations dominated the US Army's thinking.[57] Unfortunately, the post-Vietnam, conventional focused way of war, coupled with overly positivist operational and tactical doctrines, did not translate to United States military success in the post-conventional battlefield environments that came to dominate the Afghan and Iraq theatres in the early 2000s. The US Army needed a new methodology, a new set of beliefs that would lead to success in the circumstances it faced. It needed a paradigm shift.

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[54] Long, 33.

[55] Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 221-222.

[56] Paul Rich, "Introduction: A Historical Overview of US Counter-insurgency," *Small Wars & Insurgency* 25, no. 1 (February 2014), 21.

[57] Gian Gentile, *Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counter-Insurgency* (New York, NY: The New Press, 2013), 20.

FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*

The dominate narrative surrounding the United States' counterinsurgency operations in

Afghanistan and Iraq is that the United States was ill prepared. Both Daniel Marston and Corum

summarize the extensive observations on the situation that the US Army and its allies were not

ready for the transition from initial conventional operations into campaigns to counter the growing

insurgencies.[58] As Jensen and Fred Kaplan summarize, the US Army acknowledged deficiencies

with its counterinsurgency doctrine and training as early as 2004 and that the US Army undertook

efforts to rectify these shortcomings.[59] This account is the view that dominates the analysis of the

counterinsurgency situation currently as it pertains to military operations in both the Afghan and

Iraq theatres. Moreover, it was the narrative put forward by the one individual who had the most

impact on how the US and Canadian Armies would conduct counterinsurgency operations post-

2006: US Army General David Petraeus.

In an organization the size of the US Army, some might believe that the impact one

individual can have on the culture and direction of the institution is minimal. That was not the case

with General Petraeus. Assuming command of the US Army Combined Arms Center in the fall of

2005, he oversaw the various training centers, staff colleges, the Army's Lessons Learned program,

as well as the doctrine development apparatus for the US Army. As Crane outlined, General

Petraeus instituted a multitude of activities, programs, and directives that served to focus the US

Army away from post-Vietnam dominated conventional warfare.[60] Perhaps the most visible and

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[58] Daniel Marston, "Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, eds. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Westminster, MD: Osprey Publishing Ltd.), 220; Corum, 190.

[59] Jensen, 221-223; Fred Kaplan, *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 119-121, 133, 136.

[60] Crane, 59. Crane credits General Petraeus with efforts to improve the US Army's culture as a learning organization, expanding the Army's Lessons Learned program, and directing alterations to the training scenarios at the major collective training centers to focus on situations and environments prevalent in Iraq and Afghanistan.

practical demonstration of General Petraeus' impact was his direction and oversight on the creation

of a new joint US Army/Marine counterinsurgency doctrine that was published in December 2006.

Boot describes FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* as "the most influential official publication on

guerrilla warfare…since C.E. Callwell's *Small Wars* (1896) and the Marine Corps' *Small Wars*

Manual (1935)."[61] Maybe somewhat flippantly, Porch described General Petraeus' production of

FM 3-24 as riding "to the rescue with a self-reverential doctrine of a renewed American way of war

for the twenty-first century."[62] Dismissive or not, the meteoric rise in popularity of FM 3-24

coupled with General Petraeus' command of the Multi-National Force – Iraq (2007-2008), US

Central Command (2008-2010), and United States and the International Security Assistance Force

in Afghanistan (2010-2011) and put him and his doctrine at the forefront of a new paradigm to deal

with insurgencies.

General Petraeus became a counterinsurgency icon, as pronounced by Kilcullen, "if the

General were killed or even wounded, the effect it would have on public opinion and morale…

would be such that we could lose the war at a stroke. A belief in his competence had become, to

some extent, our psychological center of gravity at the strategic level."[63] As Kuhn describes, "the

transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new tradition of normal science can

emerge is far from a cumulative process, one achieved by an articulation or extension of the old

paradigm."[64] Clearly past US Army counterinsurgency practices, as articulated by pre-2006

positivist doctrine, were ineffective in dealing with the 2003-2005 insurgencies. This situation put

the US Army doctrine into a crisis point that ultimately lead to the creation of a new doctrinal

paradigm within Jackson's second and third schools. General Petraeus had a vision on how to

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[61] Boot, 541.

[62] Porch, 300.

[63] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 139.

[64] Kuhn, 84.

conduct counterinsurgencies operations and FM 3-24 was his commander's guidance to the US

Army. This doctrine certainly influenced the Canadian counterinsurgency campaign in Kandahar,

Afghanistan from 2006 to 2009 and beyond.

Chapter 4 – Case Study

This chapter focuses on the analysis of the particulars that allow for answering the primary

research question. Within the Canadian context section, the investigation explores why Canada

deployed military forces to Afghanistan and, subsequently, into Kandahar province, and then

explores the influences on the development of the Canada's counterinsurgency doctrine. The

second section compares FM 3-24 (2006) to B-GL-323, outlines Canadian operations in

Afghanistan, and concludes with a comparison of the two versions of FM 3-24.

Section 1 – The Canadian Context

Why Afghanistan? Why Kandahar?

Considering the struggles Canada had in maintaining a sense of international legitimacy

stemming from its Cold War military commitments, its legacy regarding peacekeeping, and the

strains facing the Canadian Forces in the 1990s, why does Canada commit to conducting operations

in Afghanistan?[65] Investigating political and military perspectives sheds light on why Canada chose

involvement in the Afghan mission. Following that analysis is a summation of why Canada

engaged in operations in southern Afghanistan.

From a political and policy perspective, researcher and analyst Jean-Christophe Boucher

scrutinized over 100 public statements and speeches made by Prime Ministers, Ministers of

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[65] For publications detailing the challenges the Canadian Army faced leading up to its deployment to Afghanistan, see Peter Kasurak, *A National Force: The Evolution of Canada's Army, 1950-2000* (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2013); J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace*, 2nd ed. (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2011); Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto, ON: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2009).

National Defence, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs between 2001 and 2008. Boucher reduces the

reasons Canada sent its military to Afghanistan into three primary narratives.

First is a self-referential motive that stressed involvement in the mission in Afghanistan as

protecting Canada's national interests and ideals. This narrative had two components; one that

emphasized involvement in the Afghan mission as protecting Canada from international terrorism

and the other that spoke to promoting Canadian values abroad.[66] The second narrative, divided into

two components, drew on altruistic motives. There was an attempt to improve the overall security

situation for the Afghan people coupled with the thinking that Canada needed to alleviate human

suffering and advance the institutional and economic situation in a war-torn country.[67] The final

narrative outlined Canada's obligations as an affluent member of the international community

coupled with its obligations to its various alliances and treaties. This narrative also underscored, to

a lesser extent, Canada's longstanding partnership with the United States.[68]

While it may be clear why Canada became involved in the mission to Afghanistan initially,

one has to ask why did Canada move from its operations near Kabul to Kandahar province in 2005?

Two perspectives provide contrary explanations. The first viewpoint investigated represents the

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[66] Jean-Christophe Boucher, "Selling Afghanistan: A Discourse Analysis of Canada's Military Intervention, 2001-2008," *International Journal* 64, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 721, 724-728; Houchang Hassan-Yari, "Canada in Afghanistan: Continuity and Clarity," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 9, no. 1 (Fall 2006): 3, accessed December 29, 2016, http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/issue/view/18. Hassan-Yari refers to the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan when he states that it was in Canada's interests that "[t]he stability and security of Afghanistan is vital for the security of the world. …that it reflects the Afghans' great achievement and great hope for continued success. An Afghanistan that is peaceful, pluralist and prosperous."

[67]Boucher, 721, 727-728; Hassan-Yari, 6. Hassan-Yari refers to the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan when he states that it was in Canada's interests that "[t]he stability and security of Afghanistan is vital for the security of the world. …that it reflects the Afghans' great achievement and great hope for continued success. An Afghanistan that is peaceful, pluralist and prosperous."

[68] Boucher, 721, 728-730; Hassan-Yari, 5. Hassan-Yari's writings support this narrative, which states that Canada's deployment of forces to Afghanistan in 2003 is "consistent with Canada's traditional attachment to UN and NATO, cornerstones of its foreign and defence policy."

dominant trope. The second view provides a distinctive counter-narrative. Understanding both of these accounts allows for an appreciation of the Canadian context for military operations in Kandahar.

According to the prevailing narrative, represented by Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, Prime Minister (PM) Paul Martin's foreign policy objectives in 2005 were very clear, and they did not include Afghanistan.[69] Well aware that Canada was committed to send a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Kandahar, PM Martin sought support from his Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Rick Hillier. General Hillier pledged that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Afghanistan would not limit the Government of Canada's options to contribute elements of the Canadian Forces to operations in other areas of the world.[70]

Yet, according to Stein and Lang, General Hillier convinced PM Martin that Canada's commitment to southern Afghanistan needed to be robust.[71] The Stein and Lang description implies that Canada made, what amounted to, a unilateral decision to deploy forces in southern Afghanistan as a means to gain favor with the United States and as a way to bring Canada's foreign policy objectives into the forefront of international affairs. The narrative also credits a charismatic General Hillier with convincing PM Martin that embarking upon the mission in Kandahar was in the national interest. Unsurprisingly, the counter-narrative suggests that other factors were more important.

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[69] Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto, ON: Viking Canada, 2007), 189-191. The Canadian PM desires a focus of its foreign policy on contributing to a UN effort to end the violence in Darfur, address the ongoing suffering of the people of Haiti, and strengthens the ongoing Middle East peacekeeping operation between Israel and Hezbollah; Canada's commitment to Afghanistan was not the priority.

[70] Bill Schiller, "The Road to Kandahar," *Toronto Star*, September 9, 2006, accessed January 22, 2017, https://www.pressreader.com/canada/toronto-star/20060909/282806416789534.

[71] Stein and Lang, 184, 196. The operation must be significant enough to resonate in Washington, ensures Canada is not marginalized as it had been in the Balkans, and frames the reinvigoration efforts General Hillier proposes for the Canadian Forces.

A more contemporary opinion, represented by Matthew Willis, argues there were three

critical factors that led Canada towards its deployment to Kandahar in 2005. The first involved

political decisions within the NATO alliance. The second revolved around Canada's military

experiences with its operations in the Balkans in the 1990s and early 2000s. The final aspect spoke

to specific partnerships Canada shares with two NATO allies, the United Kingdom (UK) and the

Netherlands.

A significant initial problem with the NATO mission in Afghanistan was that there were,

by 2003, effectively two ongoing campaigns in the same theatre of operations, motivated by

differing United States and NATO politics and policies.[72] As the United States sought to drawdown

military forces from Afghanistan for its operations in Iraq, the United Nations (UN)-sanctioned,

NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) mission underwent an expansion in

order to impose its footprint throughout Afghanistan. Both the United States and ISAF needed a

bridging force for southern Afghanistan, one that could initially operate under an Operation

Enduring Freedom (OEF) mandate then transition to an ISAF one.[73] Canada was a logical fit,

especially since it desired to increase its foreign policy profile through use of its military.

The second factor in Willis' narrative involved Canadian experiences stemming from its

missions in the Balkans in the 1990s and early 2000s.[74] The Canadian Government did not want to

repeat the situation of deploying large numbers of forces without gaining international recognition

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[72] Matthew Willis, "An Unexpected War, a Not-Unexpected Mission: The Origins of Kandahar 2005," *International Journal* 67, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 985-986. There is the US-led OEF, focusing on counter-terrorism, concurrently with the UN-mandated ISAF, motivated by notions of nation building. These two parallel missions lack a unified command structure; often have contradictory objectives, and serves to confuse the Afghan population in the dissimilarities of the respective approaches and tactics.

[73] Ibid., 988-990. The force necessary for this transition had to be feasible in that sufficient combat power can deploy into Kandahar in 2005-06, acceptable to both US and NATO interests regarding the balance of costs and risks, and suitable in that it can operate under both OEF and ISAF commanders' intents.

[74] Ibid., 990. Canada's military contributions to the UN-mission in the former Yugoslavia does not result in "commensurate recognition or influence over political or military strategic decisions." For a mission in Kandahar, Canada wants to be in the position to command its soldiers, not make them subordinate to the interests of other nations as it had in the Balkans. Accepting the crossover OEF to ISAF mission in Kandahar provides Canada the opportunity to be the master of its own destiny.

of its efforts.[75] The move to southern Afghanistan also sought to capitalize on another lesson

Canada learned in the Balkans, the necessity to work with like-minded partners.

Willis provides a detailed description of the various political and military factors involving

both the UK and the Dutch regarding their decisions to move into southern Afghanistan as part of

ISAF's expansion plan.[76] Canadian military planners, aware of the logistical challenges posed by a

move into southern Afghanistan, wanted to capitalize on proximity to the Kandahar Airfield in

order to sustain the deployment. The British, also interested in assuming responsibility for

Kandahar, were more concerned in securing Canadian partnership in the south and indicated that

they would deploy into Helmand.[77] Reassured that both the British and Canadians agreed to deploy

into southern Afghanistan, the Dutch decided to position their forces in Uruzgan. Through the

partnerships of these three countries, reinforced by their shared experiences of working together

during Balkans peacekeeping operations, the stage was set for ISAF's expansion into southern

Afghanistan during 2005-2006.

By agreeing to move its forces from Kabul to Kandahar, Canada embarked upon a very

different style of military operations than it had experienced in the past. The situation in southern

Afghanistan was unlike anything the military faced. As a result, in 2005, Canadian Army leadership

ordered the creation of its own counterinsurgency doctrine. The publication of that manual, in 2008,

reflected Canada's unique approach towards doctrine development.

Thought Collectives and B-GL-323 *Counter Insurgency Operations*

There are many historical examples of the influences the United States military has on the

formation of Canadian doctrine. Howard Coombs illustrates this point in an excellent case study on

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[75] Hillier, 343.

[76] Willis, 990-994.

[77] Ibid., 992-994. Further, as the British are the lead-nation for ISAF's counter-narcotics efforts and Helmand is the region that produces the largest quantities of opium in Afghanistan, it is logical to allow Canada to assume responsibility for Kandahar.

Canada's adoption of the operational level of war. Coombs, crediting Polish scientist and philosopher Ludwik Fleck, wrote of the concept of thought collectives and that the Canadian Forces came to embrace the operational level of war through their use.[78] As Coombs demonstrated, the US Army underwent a doctrinal paradigm shift, in Jackson's third school of doctrine, with the implementation of FM 100-5 *Operations* in 1982; for it is in this doctrinal manual that the US Army institutionalized its belief in the operational level of war.[79]

Coombs indicated that Canada did not undergo its own paradigm shift regarding the operational level of war because the Canadian Forces was in a doctrinal thought collective with the US Army. Canada, instead, "absorbed, imitated, and promulgated these new ideas in the manner described by Fleck."[80] Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine adopted the operational level of war in 1995, and the Canadian Army followed suit in 1996.[81] The implications of thought collectives again influenced Canadian doctrine, when, in 2008, Canada releases its own counterinsurgency doctrine, two years after the US Army published FM 3-24.

Similar to the US Army, the Canadian Army has a doctrinal hierarchy. At its pinnacle rests B-GL-300-001/FP-001, *Land Operations*, which is the doctrinal capstone. This manual is doctrine of Jackson's third school, the operational manual. However, B-GL-300 is also a hybrid in that it ascends into Jackson's forth school, the military strategic. In fact, most Canadian Army doctrine

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[78] A thought collective is "participants in a definable and collective structure of thought generated by an esoteric circle of authorities, or experts. The group communicates knowledge within a circle of laypeople that provides feedback on these views. Knowledge passes from the inner to outer circles and back again so that this cycle is strengthened and collectivized. This complex, open system of exchange can create a weakening of existing systems of beliefs, and encourage new discoveries and ideas." Howard G. Coombs, "In the Wake of a Paradigm Shift: The Canadian Forces College and the Operational Level of War (1987-1995)," *Canadian Military Journal* 10, no. 2 (2010): 25, accessed January 26, 2017, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol10/no2/index-eng.asp.

[79] Ibid., 20.

[80] Ibid., 25.

[81] Ibid., 25.

throughout the hierarchy follows the pattern of incorporating aspects of different Jacksonian doctrinal schools in the same manual.

This approach results in two unique differences when comparing doctrines of the US Army and the Canadian Army. First, there are significantly less doctrinal manuals in the Canadian Army across all of Jackson's schools when compared to the US Army. Second, most Canadian manuals are significantly larger transcripts than their US Army equivalents; this is because most Canadian doctrine will incorporate text which spans two, and sometimes all three, levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical). B-GL-323-004/FP-003 *Counter-Insurgency Operations* is a doctrinal manual that is a hybrid of three of Jackson's schools. While its primary purpose rests in the operational level, it also addresses strategic as well as tactical considerations.[82]

Although the Canadian Army published B-GL-323 in December 2008, on the direction of the Director of Army Doctrine, it produced its initial draft counterinsurgency doctrine in late 2005.[83] While Canada had some limited history dealing with insurgencies, B-GL-323 represented the Canada's first dedicated counterinsurgency doctrine.[84] Effectively starting from a blank slate, yet drawing on both historical and contemporary counterinsurgency examples, the opportunity to put a distinctively Canadian perspective into its counterinsurgency doctrine existed.

Unlike both the United States and UK, past counterinsurgency policies, practices, and doctrines did not burden Canadian Army counterinsurgency manual writers; this allowed for

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[82] "This publication is intended to assist in the planning and conduct of a COIN campaign and its constituent operations. It provides guidance to all levels of command." B-GL-323-004/FP-003, *Counter-Insurgency Operations* (Kingston, ON: Army Publishing Office, 2008), iii.

[83] David Lambert, "Adapting the Canadian Army Organization: 'Transformation' and the Enduring Nature of Warfare," *Security Challenges* 6, no.1 (Autumn 2010), 65. At the time of writing this article, then Major David Lambert was a staff officer in the Department of Army Doctrine and was the lead author of B-GL-323.

[84] Some historical examples of Canadian involvement with insurgencies include the United Empire Loyalists and the American Revolution (~1774-1783), the Fenian Raids (1866 and 1870), the Northwest Rebellion (1885), the Siberia Expedition (1918-1919), the Oka Crisis (1990), and United Nations' Stabilization Mission in Haiti (2004).

exploration and inclusion of new contemporary concepts without risking offending previous

Canadian counterinsurgency practitioners or experts. The result is that Canada was in an excellent

position to capitalize on Fleck's theory of thought collectives and leveraged the work of other

agents and forms such as NATO, the ABCA Armies' Program, the UK's Joint Doctrine cell, as well

as the US Army's creation of FM 3-24.[85]

It is now critical to transition to an appreciation of the similarities and differences between

United States and Canadian counterinsurgency doctrines, coupled with a description of Canadian

counterinsurgency operations in Kandahar. For it is this exploration that identifies the key Canadian

influences on the 2014 revision of FM 3-24.

Section 2 – Compare, Contrast, and Analyze

Similarities: FM 3-24 and B-GL-323

In general, while there are many similarities between the two doctrines, three dominate.

First, both doctrines subscribe to a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency. In addition,

both doctrines draw inspirations from Galula for their respective descriptions of counterinsurgency

principles (see table 2). Finally, both manuals dedicate a chapter towards the importance of

intelligence in counterinsurgency and the language found within these chapters is remarkably

similar.[86] However, more important to this monograph are the differences between the two

doctrines.

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[85] Neil Chuka, *Similar But Different: The Canadian Army Doctrinal Perspective on Counter-Insurgency* (Ottawa, ON: Centre for Operational Research & Analysis, 2008), 8-9.

[86] Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), Chapter 3; B-GL-323, Chapter 7.

Table 2. Similarities in Counterinsurgency Principles

David Galula[87]	United States Doctrine[88]	Canadian Doctrine[89]
The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgents as for the insurgent.	Legitimacy is the main objective.	Conduct longer-term post-insurgency planning.
	Political factors are primary.	Effect political primacy in the pursuit of a strategic aim.
Support is gained through an active minority.	Counterinsurgents must understand the environment.	Understand the complex dynamics of the insurgency, including the wider environment.
	Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support.	Separate the insurgents from their physical and moral sources of strength.
Support from the population is conditional.	Security under the rule of law is essential.	Neutralize the insurgent.
	Unity of effort is essential.	Promote unity of purpose to coordinate the actions of participating agencies.
Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.	Intelligence drives operations.	Exploit intelligence and information.
	Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment.	Sustain commitment to expend political capital and resources over a long period.

Source: Created by author (February 2017)

Differences: FM 3-24 (2006) and B-GL-323

There are three distinct differences between the Canadian and United States'
counterinsurgency manuals. First are the distinctions in describing approaches to
counterinsurgency, especially the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach. Second is a contrasting
emphasis with respect to moral considerations. Third is differing styles concerning strategic
considerations. Investigation and analysis of these three differences is critical to answering this
monograph's key research question: did Canada's counterinsurgency doctrine and its operations in
Kandahar in 2009-2010 influence the 2014 revision of FM 3-24?

US Army counterinsurgency doctrine, as found at FM 3-24, Chapter 5, *Executing COIN
Operations*, indicates that there are many different approaches available to a force when conducting

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[87] David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 74-80.

[88] FM 3-24 (2006), 1-20 – 1-24.

[89] B-GL-323, 3-3 – 3-15.

counterinsurgency operations, but, the manual highlights three.[90] The Limited Support approach

focuses on building host nation capability and capacity, expecting host nation security forces to

conduct all security and combat operations.[91] A Combined Action approach is a technique that

organizes US forces with host nation counterparts into a single organization to effect stability

related operations.[92] The CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach "is executed in a specific, high-priority

area experiencing overt insurgent operations;" and represents a significant commitment of resources

over a prolonged period.[93]

In describing the Limited Support approach, FM 3-24 provides five sentences. Regarding a

Combined Action approach, FM 3-24 describes it in seven paragraphs and includes a single

vignette. Yet, when outlining the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach, FM 3-24 dedicates thirty

paragraphs over six pages and a lengthy vignette. Clearly, FM 3-24 articulates a preference with

respect to approaches and that CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD is the favored method for the execution of

counterinsurgency operations. Reinforcing this preference is the fact that both the Limited Support

and Combined Action approaches refer to aspects of CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD, implying that

utilizing the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach is necessary for counterinsurgency success. Given

that the writing of FM 3-24 occurs during the height of both the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies, it is

no coincidence that the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach features in Western doctrine, as well as

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[90] "There are many approaches to achieving success in a COIN effort. The components of each approach are not mutually exclusive. Several are shared by multiple approaches. The approaches described below are not the only choices available and are neither discrete nor exclusive. They may be combined, depending on the environment and available resources. The following methods and their components have proven effective. However, they must be adapted to the demands of the local environment." FM 3-24 (2006), 5-18.

[91] Ibid., 5-25.

[92] Ibid., 5-23 – 5-24.

[93] Ibid., 5-18.

the media, prominently. With US Army doctrine describing an approach that it trusts will bring success in counterinsurgency, what then does Canadian doctrine believe with respect to the counterinsurgency paradigm?

B-GL-323 does not outline counterinsurgency approaches in a similar fashion to FM 3-24. Instead, Canadian doctrine provides a less prescriptive and more generalist attitude in describing how to approach counterinsurgency operations. Found within B-GL-323, Chapter 5, Section 3, *Implementation and Execution of the Campaign Plan* are the ideas that represent the closest similarities to FM 3-24's counterinsurgency approaches. Instead of detailed approaches, Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine uses the *tache d'huile* or ink-spot theory coupled to a host of operational and tactical planning and execution variables.[94]

Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine focuses on describing a myriad of operational-level planning considerations, such as securing a firm base, engaging at the lowest level of government, clearing areas of insurgent presence and influences, putting host-nation in the lead in the return of displaced persons, developing a security presences, and others.[95] Additional details found within Chapter 5, Section 4, *Considerations in the Application of Military Doctrine in a COIN Campaign* and Section 5, *The Role of Military Service Components and Indigenous Forces in COIN* serve to reinforce these factors further.[96]

The natural conclusion is that the Canadian Army does not, by the very nature of how it describes counterinsurgency campaigns and operations, believe that it should restrict commanders

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[94] "The concept of the campaigning COIN forces, and with them their security and control and other agencies working to the same end, spreading like a **tache d'huile** or **ink spot** over the contested environment is an effective, practical and methodical manner of achieving success in the campaign (emphasis in original)." B-GL-323, 5-22.

[95] Ibid., 5-23 – 5-29.

[96] Ibid., 5-30 – 5-39. Section 4 describes: balance across full-spectrum operations, compression across the levels of command, a manoeuvrist approach, mission command, describing operational success in a counterinsurgency campaign, destruction of insurgents, attacking insurgent legitimacy, attacking insurgent funding, and simultaneity. Section 5 outlines: land, air, and maritime components, special forces, indigenous security forces/police forces, indigenous military forces, and indigenous irregular auxiliary forces.

or planners to a given approach. It does not put its doctrinal weight of effort into any one, or even a series of, approaches. Instead, Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine prescribes a multitude of planning considerations, affording the campaign commander and staffs the latitude to define their own approach. The findings chapter discusses the outcome of this doctrinal methodology. The next significant difference between the two doctrines involves moral considerations.

FM 3-24 addresses morality and ethics in clusters and vignettes throughout the manual. However, it is in Chapter 7 that one finds the bulk of the doctrine's allusions to ethics. The section titled *Ethics* implores US forces to hold the highest standards of moral and ethical conduct, speaks to the necessity to protect noncombatants, and to retain high ethical/moral standards as a means to denying insurgents a method to discredit the United States and its military.[97] The Canadian doctrine, as described by Neil Chuka, is similar but different.

B-GL-323's Chapter 3, *COIN Principles* represents the most significant difference from FM 3-24. Instead of a section on ethics or morality like FM 3-24, B-GL-323 includes two unique sub-sections: *Avoidance of Moral Relativism* and *Avoidance of Cultural Absolutism*.[98] In essence the Canadian Army believes, as its doctrine demonstrates, that morality is anchored upon universal principles of right and wrong; and as such, there is no place for moral relativism in military operations.[99] Further, B-GL-323 cautions that morals and cultural values are not to be confused, and that the Canadian soldiers must avoid attempts to impose Canadian cultural-based values upon any

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[97] FM 3-24 (2006), 7-5.

[98] Chuka, 9.

[99] "Moral relativism is the doctrine that morality exists in relation to culture, society, or historical context and that there is no absolute right or wrong. Moral relativism assumes that morals are not universal and therefore confuses culture and morality. Such an assumption and the ensuing practice are wrong." B-GL-323, 3-16 – 3-17.

given society.[100] As Chuka describes, these sub-sections "make this discussion explicit, rather than simply [sic] through the use of vignettes, and is used to help guide the judgement of the reader in distinguishing what is a cultural practice they should avoid attempting to interfere with, and practices which contravene universal morals, which tend to support illegal activities."[101] The final major distinction between the two manuals involves investigation of the different styles for addressing strategic considerations.

While FM 3-24 does not label any given chapter or section as 'strategic considerations' explicitly, Chapter 2 *Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities* is about as close as it comes. The opening sentence of the leading paragraph speaks to the requirement for a "comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power."[102] Chapter 2 outlines the necessity for integration of civil-military efforts achieved by unity of command and effort, outlines key counterinsurgency participants and their roles, addresses key civil-military responsibilities and integration mechanisms, and concludes with tactic-level interagency considerations.[103]

Without attempting to open a Pandora's box debate, one can simplify a definition of strategy as a description of 'why' something is done and what that something is 'for' as opposed to 'how' to do something or with what 'resources' are available to accomplish an aim or goal. To this end, FM 3-24's Chapter 2 falls short of strategic guidance. Each of the chapter's sections and sub-sections outline specifically how to achieve a unity of effort between civilian-military activities, but does not address the 'why' these activities are worth doing nor what these activities are 'for.' In

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[100] "It is possible to assume that one's societal and **cultural values** and norms are universal and equivalent to morals. Thus, one may attempt to impose social constructs unsuited to the culture and society in which a campaign is being conducted. This is a form of cultural absolutism. Such an assumption and situation risks creating or exacerbating the perception that foreigners are trying to impose values and beliefs at odds with those of the indigenous population (emphasis in original)." B-GL-323, 3-18.

[101] "Neither the US or UK manuals attempts to distinguish these discrete issues, a significant oversight given the complexity of the environments soldiers are called upon to serve in overseas." Chuka, 10.

[102] FM 3-24 (2006), 2-1.

[103] Ibid., 2-1 – 2-14.

other words, FM 3-24 describes the various ways, and associated means, necessary to achieve ends. The manual implies that its reader will find articulated ends somewhere else. As such, FM 3-24 clearly resides in Jackson's third school of doctrine; it is an operational manual. How then does B-GL-323 address strategy?

B-GL-323, Chapter 4 *Strategic-Level Considerations for Counter Insurgency* outlines what Canada believes is necessary 'for' counterinsurgency and to what ends a counterinsurgency campaign is developed. The chapter is broken into five sections that address the government concept, strategic objectives, threshold circumstances and considerations, military commitment, and the withdrawal of military forces.[104] Overall, these sections outline what the Canadian Army believes counterinsurgency is for and why do counterinsurgency operations. Section 3 *Strategic Considerations* is the best illustration of the differences in the two manuals.

Section 3 states, "the ultimate objective [of the counterinsurgent] will be achieved by a combination of complementary objectives under the overall direction of the highest civilian authority."[105] A strategy that adheres to the following policy objectives achieves the desired end:

- Political policy that will develop responsible governance, a competent civil service and politically subordinate security forces;
- Economic policy that will create enduring and pervasive wealth to meet basic needs and expectations;
- Social programmes that seek to develop current and future generations; and
- Security operations that create a framework in which other elements of power may operate and foster the development of indigenous forces to assume and fulfil their own security requirements.[106]

B-GL-323's Chapter 3 (and specifically section 3) is what the Canadian Army believes is the contract between itself and the Canadian government with respect to counterinsurgency strategy. These objectives are the 'why,' they are the ends that policy makers owe the whole spectrum of

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[104] B-GL-323, 4-1 – 4-6.

[105] Ibid., 4-3.

[106] Ibid., 4-3.

national power actors in order to develop a counterinsurgency campaign. Alluded to earlier in the literature review, much of the Canadian Army's doctrine is a hybrid of Jackson's doctrinal schools. B-GL-323 fits this model, and unlike FM 3-24, Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine embraces aspects of both Jackson's strategic and operational manuals.

Doctrine is a guide for action; it is what militaries believe will bring strategic, operational, and tactical success while conducting its operations. Yet, doctrine is not fixed. It is subject to revisions and changes in line with Kuhn's descriptions of paradigms and textbooks. The Canadian Forces in southern Afghanistan may have anchored their approach in Kandahar on precepts from FM 3-24 initially, transitioning to their own doctrine in 2008. However, it was because of the execution of tactical actions throughout Kandahar province that Canada came to a better understanding of how to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign, and more importantly, how much capability was necessary to do so effectively.

Canadian Afghan Operations 2001-2011

In February 2010, Canadian Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance, the former commander of Canadian Joint Task Force-Kandahar (JTF-K) 5-09, addressed the Atlantic Council and spoke of his experiences having just completed a deployment to Afghanistan.[107] In his presentation, Brigadier-General Vance put forward three distinct periods of operations in Afghanistan that serve

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[107] At the time of writing this monograph, General Jonathan Vance is the senior serving officer in the Canadian Army Forces as the CDS. He is an infantry officer with significant experience across all three levels of war, including a deployment to Croatia (1994), battalion command (2001-2003), a deployment with ISAF (2003), command of 1st Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (2006-2008), and twice commanding JTF-K (2009 and again in 2010) in Afghanistan. General Vance's official biography is at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/chief-of-defence-staff.page.

to frame how Canada's activities within the Kandahar theatre unfolded.[108] A general overview of the first and second periods provides the context for a deeper exploration of operations within the third period; for it was those operations in Kandahar during 2009-2010 that are most relevant to this monograph.

During the 2001 – 2006 initial period, the Canadian Army served in various capabilities in Afghanistan. In late 2001, Canada deployed Special Forces to Kandahar to assist the United States led counter-terrorism efforts. In February 2002, it followed up with an infantry battlegroup, collaborating with the 187th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 101st Airborne Division, to support US OEF. From mid-2003 to mid-2005, Canada joined ISAF in Kabul and provided an infantry battlegroup as well as undertook short-term command of the multinational brigade (February – July 2003). From February to August 2004, Canadian Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier commanded ISAF.[109] By May 2006, Canadian military capabilities completed the transition from operations in vicinity of Kabul and congregated in Kandahar.[110] The change of theatre established the forces and conditions for Canada's second period of operations in Afghanistan.

Brigadier-General Vance described the timeframe of early 2006 to 2009 as the rise of the insurgency. Lacking capacity to do otherwise, the Canadian approach to counterinsurgency in southern Afghanistan was an enemy-centric one.[111] Operation MEDUSA in September 2006 was a large-scale and uniquely conventional battle that pitted Canadian, United States, and other ISAF

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[108] General Jonathan Vance, "Transcript: Brigadier-General Vance - Canada in Afghanistan," (Speech with questions and answers, Atlantic Council of the US, Washington, DC, February 18, 2010), accessed February 19, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/transcript-brigadier-general-vance-canada-in-afghanistan.

[109] "NATO and Afghanistan," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated October 13, 2016, accessed February 25, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm.

[110] Unless otherwise noted, all dates as found at, "Canadian Armed Forces operations in Afghanistan," National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, last updated January 25, 2017, accessed February 25, 2017, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/cafla.page.

[111] For a detailed case study on Canada's enemy-centric approach from 2006 to late 2008, see Jardine and Palamar, 593-596.

forces against a determined insurgent force arrayed in well-established linear and point defensive positions.[112] This battle dominated the Canadian narrative of this second period. Even though Canada had the doctrine and desire to conduct population-centric counterinsurgency, the capacity to do so in Kandahar was not available until the third period.[113]

According to Brigadier-General Vance, the availability of United States forces from President Obama's 'Afghan surge' marked the timeframe 2009 to 2010 and beyond. The surge allowed for the conduct of Kandahar's counterinsurgency operations in accordance with both United States and Canadian doctrines.[114] However, by the conclusion of operations in 2011, the Canadian leadership in Kandahar matured their methods from the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach outline in FM 3-24 (2006).[115] Starting with Brigadier-General Vance's command of JTF-K 5-09 and carried on by Brigadier-General Dean Milner's command of JTF-K 5-10, the Canadian counterinsurgency approach became DEFINE-SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-ENABLE-TRANSITION.[116]

Commencing in the summer of 2009 with Operation KANTOLO, Canada's transition from enemy-centric to population-centric counterinsurgency operations began in the Dand district of

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[112] For more details on Operation MEDUSA, see Stein and Lang, 219-221; Lee Windsor, David Charters and Brent Wilson, *Kandahar Tour: The Turning Point in Canada's Afghan Mission* (Mississauga, ON: Wiley, 2008), 52-56; Bernd Horn, "Lesson Learned: Operation Medusa and the Taliban Epiphany," in *No Easy Task: Fighting in Afghanistan*, eds. Bernd Horn and Emily Spencer (Toronto, ON: Dundurn, 2012), 163-198; Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), 213-218.

[113] "We did not have the capacity to do everything that needed to be done to achieve success through counter insurgency. All we could do is not lose." General Vance as quoted in Granatstein, 447. "The 'clear, hold, build' strategy seemed straightforward, but low levels of troops made it virtually impossible to hold territory in Afghanistan's violent south." Jones, 254.

[114] General Vance, "Canada in Afghanistan."

[115] FM 3-24 (2006), 5-18 – 5-22.

[116] "It was necessary to (1) define the problem, (2) shape the environment, (3) clear or separate the destructive influences from the population, (4) hold through the establishment of security, (5) build capacity using governance, reconstruction, and development, (6) enable the local population, and (7) facilitate transition of control to host nation authorities." Howard G. Coombs, "Afghanistan 2010-2011: Counterinsurgency through Whole of Government," *Canadian Military Journal* 13, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 19, accessed March 7, 2017, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol13/no3/doc/30924eng.pdf.

Kandahar Province.[117] Capitalizing on the forthcoming capacities that the 2010 United States 'Afghan Surge' represented, Brigadier-General Vance directed a 'Key Village Approach' as the manner in which JTF-K conducted counterinsurgency activities.[118] The methodology was not new or unique; in fact, it was the application of Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine.[119]

Brigadier-General Vance's 2010 speech to the Atlantic Council outlined his 'Key Village Approach' with the DEFINE-SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-ENABLE-TRANSITION method, when he spoke of his first key village: Deh-e-Bag, in Dand District of Kandahar Province.

> [DEFINE] What was really required here was a good study, a good analysis before we went in, a [sic] thoughtful approach, detailed consultation with all actors, political and nongovernmental. [SHAPE] On the day we [sic] moved through the town such that you can assure yourself that there are no armed threats present. And there weren't because we told them we were coming. Tell the Taliban you're coming, they won't stay and fight; they're afraid. [CLEAR] They don't stand toe-to-toe with alliance and Afghan forces. They sprinkle a few IEDs around; but [sic] the population tells you where they are because you've shaped the environment. And for the first time, they start to see something other than warfare. [HOLD] I maintain that Canada's greatest strategic asset is that smiling Canadian soldier who [sic] says, I'm here to stay and I'm going to help you. [BUILD] We set conditions for the Afghans to do it themselves. Employment and the [sic] micro-economy start to bounce back. Kids go to school. They can get their polio vaccinations. The medical clinic opens up. [ENABLE] The environment improves such that the nongovernment actors say [sic] we can go there now. The UN shows up. Those marquee NGOs with the expertise and deep pockets start to show up. [TRANSITION] Their government shows up and it starts to become exciting. And you need a little bit of excitement. Winning a counterinsurgency is very much like making political excitement occur. People have got to get motivated.[120]

By September 2010, and following the transition of JTF-K command from Brigadier-General Vance to Brigadier-General Milner, the 'Key Village Approach' continued to guide

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[117] "Operation KANTOLO includes integrated and fully partnered counter-insurgency security operations by Canadian, Afghan and allied forces, in order to protect local development efforts and provide a more persistent and reliable security presence at the village and district level." Jardine and Palamar, 597.

[118] Caroline Leprince, "Living Among the Population in Southern Afghanistan: A Canadian Approach to Counter-insurgency," in *Canada Among Nations 2015: Elusive Pursuits Lessons from Canada's Interventions Abroad*, eds. Stephen Saideman and Fen Osler Hampson (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), 106.

[119] B-GL-323, 5-28 – 5-29.

[120] General Vance, "Canada in Afghanistan."

Canadian leadership with the application of the means to achieve directed counterinsurgency ends. Coinciding with this command transition was the large influx of United States capacities into Kandahar as a result of President Obama's 'Afghan Surge.' The introduction of United States forces in Kandahar eventually reduced the Canadian area of operations from the province of Kandahar to two key districts: Dand and Panjwayi. This allowed for greater concentration of available Canadian capabilities and supporting capacities.

As Brigadier-General Milner explained, "General Vance's village approach showed positive results, so I was able to expand on this and push it through Panjwayi. I didn't just do one; I did ten villages, because I had the troops."[121] Noteworthy is the introduction of American forces into Kandahar in late 2009, in the form of a 4,000-man BCT. The US Army assigned one unit of the BCT, the 1st Squadron/71st Cavalry Regiment, under command of the Canadian JTF-K.[122] The implications of this command relationship, and the experiences that the unit commander, Lieutenant Colonel John Paganini, had while executing the Canadian-directed counterinsurgency approach in Dand district, is extremely important in understanding how Canada influenced the revision of FM 3-24 (2014). The findings chapter will explore this situation in detail.

Investigating FM 3-24 2006 and 2014

Before considering this exploration complete, it is necessary to compare and contrast FM 3-24 (2006) and FM 3-24 (2014). This last analytical step is critical prior to having the informed discussion of causality represented in the findings chapter. The comparison between FM 3-24 (2006) and B-GL-323 identified three key differences between these two manuals. These variances were (1) the approaches to counterinsurgency operations, (2) morality and ethics, and (3) strategic

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[121] General Milner as quoted in Leprince, 109. This is precisely the ink-spot method described in B-GL-323, Chapter 5, Figure 5-10 on page 5-29.

[122] Leprince, 109.

considerations. By exploring the two US counterinsurgency manuals along these distinctions, one can ascertain if there are any significant differences or similarities.

With respect to counterinsurgency approaches, FM 3-24 (2006) put its doctrinal weight of effort in the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach.[123] FM 3-24 (2014) moves away from descriptions of approaches and instead outlines direct and indirect methods for countering insurgencies.[124] Buried within the opening paragraphs of FM 3-24 (2014), Chapter 9 *Direct Methods for Countering Insurgencies* is a warning. "Counterinsurgents should not think that all counterinsurgencies end the same way. Counterinsurgencies are conducted using a wide range of different approaches."[125] However, just as FM 3-24 (2006) outlines CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD as its preferred approach, FM 3-24 (2014) also puts its weight behind a particular counterinsurgency method, but it is now referred to as a framework.

Dedicating thirty-five paragraphs over ten pages, including one page-long vignette and two figures, is the SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION framework.[126] In all fairness, FM 3-24 (2014) outlines a myriad of other possible approaches in countering an insurgency in Chapter 10 *Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies*. Yet, when it comes to US Army capabilities operating in direct contact with an insurgency, the only articulated method is the SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION framework. Obviously, there is a difference between the two US counterinsurgency manuals, and that FM 3-24 (2014) is a matured version of FM 3-24's (2006) original CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach. The next item for analysis involves ethics and morality.

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[123] FM 3-24 (2006), 5-18 – 5-23.

[124] Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), Chapter 9-10.

[125] Ibid., 9-1.

[126] Ibid., 9-1 – 9-11.

The earlier comparison of United States and Canadian counterinsurgency doctrines

identified that FM 3-24 (2006) put its ethical emphasis into five paragraphs found in chapter 7.[127]

FM 3-24 (2014) subscribes to a very similar style; the sub-section *Ethical Application of*

Landpower in Unified Action is also a five-paragraph segment that implores American soldiers and

Marines to adhere to their professional ethic, use force proportionally and with discrimination,

accept ambiguity and risk, and highlights the importance of ethical leadership.[128] As such, there is

no meaningful difference between the two manuals. The final aspect of comparison is how the two

manuals approach strategic considerations.

The prior assessment of United States and Canadian counterinsurgency texts established

that FM 3-24 (2006) is a doctrine of Jackson's third school, the operational manual. FM 3-24

(2006) focused any reference to strategic considerations on answering the 'how' to do something as

opposed to the Canadian approach that focused on the 'why.' FM 3-24 (2014) is an expanded

version of its predecessor; the opening chapter *Understanding the Strategic Context* provides a

more detailed analysis of strategic concerns than FM 3-24 (2006). Most significantly, the new

doctrine addresses the need for political-military dialogue in order to make effective strategy, that

the US military is just one aspect of national power available in a counterinsurgency, and distinctly

articulates the ends, ways, means, and risk framework associated with contemporary US strategy

development.[129]

However, just as FM 3-24 (2006) made it clear that it is not a doctrine of Jackson's fourth

school, so too does its contemporary counterpart. "It [FM 3-24 (2014)] cannot and should not be the

only reference to conduct counterinsurgency operations for someone who wishes to fully

understand the policy tools available to the U.S. to aid a host nation fighting a

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[127] FM 3-24 (2006), 7-5.

[128] FM 3-24 (2014), 1-10 – 1-11.

[129] Ibid., 1-5.

counterinsurgency."[130] FM 3-24 (2014) points its reader to applicable US Joint doctrine, Allied

Joint Publications, and the *US Government Guide to Counterinsurgency* for additional information

on applicable policy with respect to counterinsurgency.[131] Insomuch as FM 3-24 (2014) is an

improvement over FM 3-24 (2006) regarding strategic considerations, the current US

counterinsurgency doctrine maintains its position in Jackson's third school, the operational manual.

As such, there is no significant difference between the two manuals with respect to strategic

considerations.

Chapter 5 – Findings

This chapter addresses the three differences identified in the comparison of FM 3-24 (2006)

to B-GL-323 that carries forward to the analysis of similarities and differences between the two US

Army counterinsurgency manuals: (1) counterinsurgency approaches, (2) ethics, and (3) strategic

considerations. Drawing from the impact of Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine and operations in

southern Afghanistan, this chapter will either prove or disprove causality with respect to Canadian

influences on the 2014 revision of FM 3-24.

Regarding counterinsurgency approaches, there is a marked difference between the initial

and current versions of FM 3-24. The 2006 approach of CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD is now the 2014

SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION framework. The combination of Canadian

counterinsurgency doctrine and Canadian Army operations in Afghanistan was directly attributable

to this transformation.

By the end of 2009, Canadian Brigadier-General Vance had adopted the Key Village

Approach, a practical application of Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine's *tache d'huile* or ink-

spot methodology. This approach paired with the counterinsurgency framework DEFINE-SHAPE-

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[130] FM 3-24 (2014), 1-4.

[131] Ibid., 1-4.

CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-ENABLE-TRANSITION, developed by Brigadier-Generals Vance and

Milner. It was into this situation that US Army forces surged into southern Afghanistan. One

particular unit, the 1st Squadron/71st Cavalry Regiment, then commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Paganini, came under operational command of the Canadian JTF-K. Of particular significance is

that Lieutenant Colonel Paganini, upon completion of this deployment to Afghanistan, became the

director of the US Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and it was under his

leadership and guidance that the US Army revised FM 3-24.

In an interview conducted by Caroline Leprince, Lieutenant Colonel Paganini credits

Canadian influences as a principle reason FM 3-24 (2014) adopted the SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-

BUILD-TRANSITION framework.

> Everything I did in Afghanistan and Iraq informed what I did as the director of the
> US Counterinsurgency Center. A lot of the things we did in Kandahar province
> were things that I learned from General Vance and General Milner; a lot of these
> things I took from [Major] Mark Popov and B Squadron. That informed a lot of the
> dialogue and the 'what' that went in to the counterinsurgency doctrine that we tried
> to revise. The manual we used in 2010 was based on the [sic] CLEAR-HOLD-
> BUILD construct. The biggest things we wanted to put in the update for 3-24 was
> all the necessary preparation and requirements to develop and understand the
> 'about' the [sic] operating environment before you start to clear. The terms that we
> used when I worked for Task Force Kandahar was DESCRIBE and SHAPE before
> you CLEAR. DESCRIBE and SHAPE were added to the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD,
> but there was also the part that came after the build. With General Milner, the next
> step was ENABLE. You need to take a step aside, and let them do it. General
> Vance and General Milner agreed, now you have them the way you got them, you
> get them to do everything on their own. That part was really not clarified well in
> the doctrine [FM 3-24 (2006)]; and that is one of the things we tried to add.[132]

The flexibility that Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine provided its commanders to form

their own approach coupled with Brigadier-General Vance's key village concept. This combination

was a positive influence on a key figure in the revision of FM 3-24. The outcome of this inspiration

was that, under Lieutenant Colonel Paganini's leadership and oversight, the 2014 revision of FM 3-

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[132] Lieutenant Colonel John Paganini, interviewed by Caroline Leprine, October 29, 2014.

24 matured the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach to the SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION framework. The next aspect for causality consideration involves ethics and morality.

Due to the fact that there was no significant difference between the two US counterinsurgency manuals with respect to ethics and morality, there was no indication that external factors contributed to the 2014 revision of this section. As such, one concludes that neither Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine nor Canadian military operations in southern Afghanistan had any impact or influence on the 2014 revision of FM 3-24 regarding ethics and morality. The final item to contemplate involves strategic considerations.

In a similar situation to what was described regarding ethics, there is no significant difference between the two versions of FM 3-24 with respect to strategic considerations. Both the 2006 and 2014 versions of FM 3-24 reside within Jackson's third school of doctrine. Contrasting to Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine, which incorporates aspects of both Jackson's third and fourth schools, it is clear that there was no Canadian influence regarding strategic considerations on the 2014 revision of FM 3-24.

Chapter 6 – Conclusion

Through the conduct of a process-tracing methodology of a single case study, this monograph has a two-fold purpose. First was to investigate and analyze a wide range of theoretical and scholarly research to gain a richer understanding of doctrine, insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and the context that led the publication of FM 3-24 in 2006. Second, the project considered the Canadian context that led to its military operations in Kandahar from 2001 to 2010; further, the paper scrutinized the similarities and differences of Canadian and American counterinsurgency doctrine as well as the key differences between the two versions of FM 3-24. This examination offers an answer of the primary research question: Is there Canadian influence on the 2014 revision of FM 3-24?

As the findings determine, the simple answer is yes. The transformation of FM 3-24's (2006) CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach to FM 3-24's (2014) SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION framework was directly influenced by Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine, leadership, and the conduct of their key village approach coupled with the DESIGN-SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-ENABLE-TRANSITION framework. Concerning the other key differences between FM 3-24 (2006) and B-GL-323, in the realm of ethics and strategic considerations, research concludes that there is no significant difference between the two US counterinsurgency doctrines. As such, there is no Canadian influence in this regard. At this point one may ask, so what, why does it matter, and how could this effect manifest into something important in the future?

To respond to that line of questioning, recall what this monograph implies is the purpose and function of doctrine. It is a written manifestation the philosophies and theories that reflect not only what the military believes is its current operating paradigm but also what the military believes will bring success in its future endeavors. Equally important, as a socially constructed institution, a military's doctrine is a contract between itself (as a secondary socializing institution) and its state (as the primary socializing institution). Now, cast your mind back to the United States in 2005-2006 and the debate about how the campaign in Iraq (and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan) unfolded. Throughout the entire deliberation about the situation that ultimately became the 'Iraq Surge' of 2007, the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach served as the foundation of the ensuing narrative.

Now consider the prospects regarding forthcoming responses to insurgencies in a global environment marked by conflict, hostility, asymmetric methodology, and instability. How will politicians and policy makers, the media, the military, and the population of the United States likely debate counterinsurgency campaigns, operations, and their associated efforts in the future? If history is any guide, the SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION framework linked to a

direct approach, as outlined in FM 3-24 *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, is likely to

feature prominently. For that, the United States can thank Canada.

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